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█ Abstract Accidents will survive the outbreak of driverless cars, but their moral implications will suffer 
substantial changes. The decision made today by a human in a fraction of a second will eventually be re-
placed by an algorithm subject to moral scrutiny. This not only raises the question of how the algorithm 
should work, or whether alternatives solutions are indeed comparable, but also changes the essence of the 
problem: from ascertaining liability to defining desired outcomes. In this paper, I first contest two possi-
ble approaches to resolving the driverless car dilemma – which I call statistical and nominal – to conclude 
that neither is morally sound. I then propose an alternative solution based on “time-relative equality”, or 
always sparing younger people. This follows from seeking (i) an egalitarian solution, that is (ii) the least 
intrusive – a position I defend from a possible ageist critique. 
KEYWORDS: Driverless Cars; Accident; Algorithm; Age-relative Equality 
 
█ Riassunto Condotti verso un incidente morale – Vi saranno incidenti anche dopo la diffusione delle auto 
a guida autonoma, ma le loro implicazioni morali subiranno mutamenti sostanziali. Le decisioni prese og-
gi in una frazione di secondo dagli esseri umani saranno alla fine sostituite da un algoritmo soggetto a 
controllo morale. Sorge non solo il problema di come dovrebbe funzionare questo algoritmo – o se vi sia-
no soluzioni alternative comparabili –, ma cambia anche la sostanza del problema: dall’accertamento 
dell’imputabilità alla definizione dell’esito auspicato. In questo lavoro discuterò due possibili approcci per 
risolvere il dilemma – che chiamerò “statistico” e “nominale” –, per concluderne che non sono moralmen-
te corretti. Proporrò quindi una soluzione alternativa, basata sulla “eguaglianza tempo-relativa”, il princi-
pio per cui bisogna sempre salvare il più giovane. Questo segue dal cercare (i) una soluzione egalitarista, 
che sia (ii) la meno intrusiva – una posizione che difenderò da una possibile critica che la vede come di-
scriminatoria verso gli anziani. 




█  1 Introduction 
 
EACH TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP BRINGS WITH it 
new questions; the advent of driverless cars is 
no exception. Replacing human drivers with 
software raises certain moral concerns, espe-
cially when it comes to justifying reactions to 
an accident situation. Regardless of the present 
legal constraints and remaining technical chal-
lenges – which seem to progressively pale into 
insignificance – driverless cars will soon trigger 
a paradigm shift: accidents will no longer be 
merely a matter of liability. In this paper, I con-
sider a specific type of setting: accident situa-
tions involving humans – passengers and pe-
destrians – where the driverless car can do 
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something, thereby determining who will die. 
Regardless of the criteria behind this decision, 
in this scenario, it is the car’s actions that define 
the aftermath of the accident. I shall call this 
The Driverless Car Problem. 
Two seemingly feasible approaches to this 
moral dilemma come to mind rather easily. 
The first evokes the idea behind The Moral 
Machine Experiment, an exercise developed by 
Edmond Awad and colleagues.1 In their re-
search, Awad and colleagues designed a set of 
accidents scenarios which involved several in-
dividuals characterized in terms of nine catego-
ries, including fitness and social status, among 
others. The idea behind this paradigm was to 
survey opinions about which individuals a 
driverless car should spare in each accident 
scenario, so as to infer the preferences of the 
majority. I will call this a statistical approach. A 
second option is to rank individuals using a 
score that reflects their deeds, much like the 
Chinese Social Credit System – a system that 
evaluates individuals’ behaviors as either posi-
tive or negative and translates them into a 
score.2 In the Driverless Car Problem, this ap-
proach would demand that priority be given to 
those with higher scores. Despite the obvious 
technical limitations such an approach entails, 
it is also worthwhile exploring whether it could 
provide a fair solution to the dilemma before 
us. I will call this an individual approach. 
However, I will defend neither of these 
approaches and instead propose a third op-
tion based on age-relative equality. The pa-
per is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a 
two-fold critique of the statistical approach 
that focuses on the role of the majority and 
categories. Section 3 delves into the practical 
shortcomings of the individual approach. 
Last, In Section 4, I develop my solution to 
then finish with some concluding remarks. 
 
█  2 The statistical approach 
 
█  2.1 What the people think 
 
Whether a fair theory of justice can, or 
even must be derived from public opinion is 
controversial. David Miller’s article What the 
people think triggered an intense critical ex-
change that serves to highlight some of the 
tensions engendered by a statistical approach 
to the Driverless Car Problem. After discuss-
ing his argument, I will go on to challenge the 
relevance of categories and majorities in 
seeking a moral solution to the case under 
examination. 
Briefly, Miller argues in favor of defining 
the principles that should guide just distribu-
tions in society in line with people’s norma-
tive beliefs. He defends this position first to 
avoid a theory of justice that lacks practical 
force, and second to ensure this theory ends 
up resting on principles of justice that do not 
rely (solely) on the opinions of philosophers 
(for as he points out, philosophers should not 
be assumed to have any epistemological priv-
ilege).3 However, inferring what is just from 
“what the people think” invites two direct 
critiques. On the one hand, it is practically 
impossible to obtain unanimous agreement 
from such a survey. One can hardly claim 
that “the people” think something, since eve-
ry majority will be accompanied by a dissi-
dent minority.4 On the other hand, there is a 
pressing epistemological concern: can we ev-
er really know what “the people” think?5 Ar-
guing that general opinion will guarantee a 
just outcome may be troublesome. 
One of Miller’s approaches to discovering 
how people make judgments of fairness 
about society-wide distributions of resources 
is to present «people with a series of “vi-
gnettes” in which a hypothetical person is de-
scribed – occupation, marital status, etc. – 
together with his or her income, and then ask 
the respondents how over- or underpaid they 
think that person is».6 There is, however, lit-
tle discussion about the assumptions on 
which this approach relies. 
The conceptual framework for the Moral 
Machine Experiment evokes the same idea of 
using “vignettes” to evaluate and distinguish 
the moral stance of an individual in the face of 
an ethical dilemma, given a set of broad cate-
gories. With this, I intend to cast doubt on the 
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assumption that a morally acceptable ranking 
is feasible by means of weighting the nine fac-
tors proposed by Awad and colleagues, name-
ly «sparing humans (versus pets), staying on 
course (versus swerving), sparing passengers 
(versus pedestrians), sparing more lives (ver-
sus fewer lives), sparing men (versus women), 
sparing the young (versus the elderly), sparing 
pedestrians who cross legally (versus jaywalk-
ing), sparing the fit (versus the less fit), and 
sparing those with higher social status (versus 
lower social status)».7 
Both Miller and Awad and colleagues 
seem to accept, as the starting point for their 
argument, that a preference based on majori-
ty opinion (as determined from the surveyed 
opinion) can constitute the moral substance 
for resolving an ethical dilemma. The latter, 
despite insisting on the indicative character 
of their findings,8 do so by entering into a 
formal syllogistic fallacy, that is, claiming 
that decisions need to be aligned with what 
the majority would do. The modal fallacy lies 
on their methodological approach, which con-
flates a claim about the importance of consen-
sus with its status as a necessary condition. 
This modal fallacy then allows them to argue 
that the ethical foundations of the algorithm 
must be rooted in majority opinion. Market 
acceptance, in this case at least, cannot be set 
as a sine qua non condition for the outcomes 
of an algorithm to be morally acceptable. Do-
ing so could potentially institutionalize dis-
crimination. With this, I do not intend to 
claim that the people are wrong. Instead, I in-
tend to highlight how, by inferring moral 
judgments from statistical significance, pre-
dominant beliefs that do not favor just out-
comes could very easily acquire support. 
The seemingly unavoidable existence of 
dissident minorities and the impossibility of 
really knowing “what the people think” can 
be understood from Andreas Busen’s inter-
pretation of what David Miller means by 
“what the people think”. As Busen suggests, 
Miller makes a distinction between two types 
of “thinking”. The first, which he discards, 
consists of the average of everybody’s norma-
tive beliefs. Instead, Busen suggests that what 
Miller is implying is a second kind of “think-
ing”: the type of «social knowledge that is (re)-
produced in social practices».9 However, es-
tablishing such knowledge is not only difficult 
but also dangerous: it is quite likely to stem 
from «currently dominant social norms, insti-
tutions, and practices that result from hierar-
chical power relations, ideology or the exclu-
sion of certain people or groups».10 This clari-
fies the connection I aimed to establish be-
tween majorities and dominance. 
Thus, for any statistical approach to be 
successful, it must be able to morally justify, at 
least, two crucial features: first, the use of cat-
egories to generate the input data, and second, 
decision-making by the majority. The follow-
ing subsections discuss whether a sound de-
fense of these features is possible by discussing 
some of the limitations of this view. 
 
█  2.2 On categories 
 
From a social psychological perspective, 
categories respond to a natural human ten-
dency to streamline cognitive resources. In 
order to form impressions about others, we 
tend to classify subjects according to their 
similarity to a stereotype, or the most repre-
sentative members of a category.11 When we 
conform to this cognitive mechanism, we act 
as “cognitive misers”.12 This form of heuristics 
is unbeatable from an evolutionary perspec-
tive, for it is time-efficient and «clarifies and 
refines our perception of the world. […] As 
such, categorization provides meaning, reduc-
es uncertainty, and helps us predict social be-
havior, providing prescriptive norms for un-
derstanding ourselves in relation to others».13 
Yet categorization also poses a two-fold 
philosophical problem: on the one hand, cat-
egories are world-forming (i.e. their own def-
inition constrains what is described) while, 
on the other hand, they break a continuous 
spectrum into a discrete set of hermetic con-
ceptual containers. That our vision of the 
world is shaped by categories is hardly ques-
tionable. However, and despite its efficiency, 
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this vision typically reinforces stereotype-
consistent biases, especially those reflecting 
social distinctions, such as race or ethnicity.14 
To “define” a set of categories implies ac-
knowledging clear differences between two 
individuals. In this sense, when surveying 
someone’s opinion about a specific topic, the 
person asking the questions must choose or 
define the categories that lay out the options: 
race, age, profession, gender… Asking about 
different states along these dimensions – 
which, henceforth, become categories – is 
implicitly requiring the respondents to 
acknowledge the existence of these very cate-
gorical differences. At this point, it becomes 
imperative to question whether these catego-
ries are even relevant for the study. 
Some differences could be significant, let 
us say, for classifying humans who take a 
medical test. The possibility of splitting them 
up into different groups (e.g. male and fe-
male) might indeed be crucial to making 
sense of the results. But scientifically-
purposed differences are instrumental, and 
extending their reach into the political arena 
can be damaging. 
Race, for example, is a widely contested 
category. Historical strategies to fight racial 
oppression have shifted from «accentuating 
sameness (during Abolition and the Civil 
Rights Movement) when racists emphasized 
race-conscious particularism, to praising dif-
ference (during the Black Power struggle) 
when whites insisted on color blind universal-
ism».15 However, the underlying problem is 
not related to the evolution of the anti-racist 
struggle. Instead, it is rooted in the external 
imposition of race as a classifying unit. In 
short, phenotypic differences should not in-
form political categories, since that could very 
easily lead to upholding discrimination based 
on a not-so-clear distinction, that is in turn 
not so clearly relevant.16 Thus, when pursuing 
a fair system of distributive justice or a solu-
tion to a moral dilemma, arguments should 
depart from this ambiguous construction. 
On a separate account, categories are 
simplifications of a continuum. As cognitive 
shortcuts, they reduce the complexity of 
case-by-case analysis, and thus comprehend a 
range of similar but not equal subjects. Indi-
viduals present different levels of representa-
tiveness with respect to a stereotype. This 
variability can relate both to intragroup 
membership and intergroup structure, thus 
leading to heterogeneous categories (groups 
with high internal variability) and homogene-
ous categories (with less intra-group differ-
ences).17 Individuals located at the edges of 
two contiguous categories will naturally chal-
lenge the assumption of an “essential differ-
ence”, raising a continuity problem. Those 
closer to the edge of two different categories 
will share similar traits, underling the weak-
ness of conceiving of clear-cut categorical 
differences. 
With this, I want to point out that regard-
less of the usefulness and the extensive appli-
cation of heuristics as a cognitive shortcut, 
social categorization as a means for resolving 
moral dilemmas is not justified. For this rea-
son, I argue that the methodological ap-
proach in the Moral Machine Experiment is 
flawed: respondents choose between options 
set by researchers, who assume that being or 
not being fit, male or female, or higher in so-
cial status constitutes solid grounds for re-
solving a moral dilemma. But are these op-
tions actually relevant and clearly distin-
guished? Apparently, we cannot escape cate-
gories. But if they are to be used in ethical di-
lemmas, they must be relevant – and, at this 
point, I cannot make the claim that the fac-
tors proposed in the Moral Machine Experi-
ment are clearly relevant. 
 
█ 2.3 The concept of majority 
 
There are several accounts that claim, 
with different levels of emphasis, that an al-
gorithm must be acceptable to a majority of 
the population in order to enjoy moral suc-
cess – this resembles Miller’s idea of a fair 
system of distributive justice. To understand, 
however, the relevance of a majoritarian 
stance, it is necessary to define what a major-
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ity is – an idea that cannot be fully detached 
from another related idea, that of the disso-
nant minority.18 
On the one hand, and from the socio-
psychological standpoint, negative stereo-
types are mistakenly associated with minori-
ty groups through a mechanism called illuso-
ry correlation. This consists of wrongly be-
lieving that two variables are correlated when 
there is little or no actual association. This 
can be explained by the notion of shared dis-
tinctiveness, which consists in connecting in-
frequent characteristics with infrequent indi-
viduals.19 The prevalence with which nega-
tive stereotypes are associated with minority 
groups is then maintained by a natural ten-
dency to stress in-group similarities and out-
group differences. On the other hand, a sta-
tistical approach to majority reveals how the 
majority-minority duality arises naturally 
from the aftermath of surveying a population 
with different views on a given topic. As a 
consequence, some options will have more 
support than others – that is the majoritarian 
view. But what do majorities mean? 
Arrow’s impossibility theorem is one of 
the most well-known ideas in social choice 
theory. It explains that there is no way to 
transform individual ranked preferences into 
social or community-wide ranked prefer-
ences without violating one of the following 
five conditions: unrestricted domain, pareto 
optimality, independence of irrelevant alter-
natives, not imposing the social welfare func-
tion, and a non-dictatorial social welfare 
function.20 Hence, we can infer that polling 
individual preferences with the intention of 
drawing clear social preferences will be im-
possible. As Arrow stated, «if we exclude the 
possibility of interpersonal comparisons of 
utility, then the only methods of passing 
from individual tastes to social preferences 
which will be satisfactory and which will be 
defined for a wide range of sets of individual 
orderings are either imposed or dictatori-
al».21 Hence, majorities are delusional sim-
plifications of “what the people think”. To 
this, I shall add that the statistical account 
presumes a non-existent equality between 
individuals, without due consideration of his-
torical contingencies and patterns of discrim-
ination. 
Thus, buttressing the solution to the Driv-
erless Car Problem on a statistical majority will 
imply either misrepresenting a complex land-
scape of preferences, or violating one or more 
conditions of Arrow’s impossibility theorem – 
meaning that such an approach will see its 
normative capacity diminished. Moreover, 
surveying individuals’ preferences about their 
fellow citizens is more likely to reflect embed-
ded relations of oppression than to provide a 
just solution to the dilemma. This is well illus-
trated by the Moral Machine Experiment, 
which reported a “statistical preference” to 
spare dogs before criminals22 – a result that 
provides food for thought. 
By knowing the opinion of the majority, one 
can easily make an algorithm and its ra-
tionale match the general opinion of what 
ought to be done and why. But it is a differ-
ent thing to claim that such acceptance is 
necessary for it to be morally acceptable. 
This form of reasoning responds to the mod-
al fallacy I highlighted earlier, a form of in-
ferring necessity that seems to follow due to a 
cultural bias towards market-based decision-
making. In sum, an accepting majority makes 
an algorithm more popular but does not suf-
fice to make it morally acceptable. 
 
█  3 An individual approach 
 
To move away from a statistical approach 
means to assess each individual as an inde-
pendent unit and not as a member of a 
group. As in China’s Social Credit System, 
each person is thus allocated a unique score. 
The source of this score could be virtually 
anything, but a detailed description of what 
makes an individual scoring system fair falls 
outside the scope of this paper. What is re-
markable about this approach is the underly-
ing idea that individuals should be compared 
via a score based on their deeds. This, how-
ever, entails several problems. 
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Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale, in 
their research paper The Scored Society, point 
to some of the essential flaws linked to the 
use of predictive algorithms, a form of the in-
dividual approach that makes predictions 
about future events based on historical facts. 
They do so by contrasting the opportunities 
and threats these algorithms present.23 
Through a case study of scoring systems used 
to calculate financial risk, they highlight the 
main deficits of automated scoring systems. 
Citron and Pasquale argue that these systems 
are opaque, foster arbitrariness, and have 
disparate impacts. However, the problem 
with this view is two-fold. On the one hand, 
arbitrary assessments and disparate impacts 
are not consequences, but potential features 
of a predictive algorithm – even more so if it 
is developed under a veil of opacity. On the 
other hand, they seem to overlook the rea-
sonable concern that such algorithms will 
lead to increased threats to privacy . 
However, and to digress, their analysis 
suggests that there is nothing intrinsically 
wrong with individual scoring systems. On 
the contrary, what they find morally repre-
hensible are both bad implementations and 
lack of oversight. Authoritarian decisions are 
not seen to be a hallmark of scoring systems, 
but the byproduct of poor implementations. 
In this section, I first discuss the role of 
transparency in predictive algorithms. I then 
continue by introducing the possibility that 
these algorithms will become a threat to pri-
vacy. I finish with a brief account of surveil-
lance capitalism to better understand the ex-
tent of this approach. 
 
█ 3.1 Lack of transparency 
  
Without transparent algorithms and con-
trol over automated systems, «societies are 
destined to continue to reinforce patterns of 
entrenched privilege and disadvantage, widen-
ing gaps between rich and poor, and perpetua-
tion of disadvantage».24 Transparency allows 
individuals and experts to identify features that 
could end up triggering arbitrary decisions. 
Far from being sufficient, access to the 
source code of algorithms is nevertheless im-
portant; it provides an opportunity to chal-
lenge their logic and detect possible sources 
of bias. But transparency per se does not 
guarantee a just outcome. Its utility is in-
strumental, acting like a bridge of confidence 
between the subjects under evaluation and 
the system – which, in turn, must run on fair 
criteria and be implemented systematically. 
Fair criteria must be the essence of any 
decision tree that aspires to be just. As Citron 
and Pasquale highlight, decisions-by-
algorithm must avoid categorization by corre-
lation – that is classifying people based on 
categories such as race, gender, or sexual ori-
entation.25 The very same critique was ap-
plied to statistical approaches in the previous 
section, with a formal nuance that consti-
tutes, in fact, a major conceptual difference: 
in statistical approaches, categorization [of 
different kinds] is inevitable, whereas in in-
dividual approaches correlative categories 
can be more easily avoided. 
Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that 
principles are implemented in a systematic 
way. The convergence of fair criteria and 
their systematic application would ensure 
that people were treated in a just manner. 
The danger of arbitrariness and discrimina-
tion would then disappear, making it easier 
for the algorithms to go from the «illusion of 
precision and reliability» to actually becom-
ing accurate and fair.26 
One aspect of this question is whether the 
algorithm risks being authoritarian if it re-
mains in a black box, even if the principles 
behind it are fair and its implementation sys-
tematic. What role does publicity play? For 
Andrew Mason, the reason for publicity – or 
transparency – «derives from two sources. 
[…] The first source of its appeal is the idea 
that justice itself is better promoted by pub-
licly checkable rules; the second source is the 
idea that publicity tends to promote stabil-
ity».27 However, publicity is not a necessary 
feature to prevent a scoring system from be-
coming authoritarian. This could be achieved 
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by “technological due process” – or the idea 
that algorithms should «live up to some 
standard of review and revision to ensure 
their fairness and accuracy».28 The second 
aspect of this question is whether making an 
algorithm transparent suffices to make the 
system fair. This, I believe, I have already an-
swered. But for the sake of clarity, transpar-
ency itself does not make an algorithm fair, it 
just increases its chances of being fair. 
 
█ 3.2 A threat to privacy 
 
Designing fair, systematic, and transpar-
ent algorithms is not enough to wash away 
the threat of authoritarianism. That is be-
cause even when a system presents such val-
ues, the possibility of it becoming too inva-
sive remains. Authoritarianism can manifest 
here in two ways. The first, I have already 
covered: it can l unjust decisions based on 
unfair criteria, and/or a bad implementation, 
all sustained by lack of transparency. The 
second concerns overreach. 
Granting access to our personal data is 
something we constantly do – to the gov-
ernment, to our service providers, to our 
friends… The main difference between each 
case is the form and extent of our consent. 
The internet is one of the most shady cases, 
since we often consent without wanting to or 
knowing that we have done so. We condone 
“unconscionable contracts” – namely exploita-
tive contracts between data subjects and ser-
vice providers buttressed on the inability to 
negotiate29 – sometimes because we do not 
even know that we are bound by one, and at 
other times because there seems to be no bet-
ter alternative. 
While we are online, we contribute to im-
ages of ourselves that are formed via the in-
ternet and social media. Lori Andrews out-
lines how every click on a social network is 
an earmark that contributes to the assembly 
of your “cyber-self” – a virtual representation 
of who you are. In turn, every trace and ob-
servation is used to influence decisions and 
opportunities that concern you – i.e. your ac-
cess to mortgages, jobs, and discounts 
amongst others.30 In an attempt to control 
this, Europe has developed the so-called Gen-
eral Data Protection Regulation, which in-
tends to look after European citizens by mov-
ing away from a paradigm of abusive rela-
tions between companies and users and turn-
ing this relationship into one based on af-
firmative consent, that ensures easier access 
to our own personal data and grants the right 
to be forgotten.31 
All of this leads to the virtual self being 
most commonly invoked when an individual 
approach to the Driverless Car Problem is 
suggested. However, I believe there is a sub-
stantial difference between the profiling we 
are subjected to on the internet and an indi-
vidual approach to the Driverless Car Prob-
lem. Whilst the first aims to yield a benefit 
from the use of personal information, the 
second aims at resolving what we consider a 
moral dilemma. 
That obvious – and not so obvious – dif-
ferences between individuals exist is hardly 
debatable. In practice, however, the equilib-
rium between an egalitarian ethos and our 
conception of our own personal exceptionali-
ty is fragile. My argument does not challenge 
the existence of differences between individ-
uals. But whether these differences justify an 
unequal score and, consequently, unequal 
treatment seems less clear. And that in turn 
demands that we ask if such differences are 
even relevant to the stated problem – a ques-
tion I address in Section 4. 
 
█ 3.3 Surveillance capitalism 
 
Individual approaches are commonly as-
sociated with “flawed democracies” or other 
political systems that do not respect individ-
ual liberties. But corporations in western de-
mocracies regularly violate certain forms of 
individual rights through dataveillance prac-
tices or the monitorization of online personal 
data and metadata. 
Based on the ideals of human rights, Jona-
than Cinnamon argues that privacy provides 
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the grounds for freedom of speech and asso-
ciation, thus constituting «a unifying narra-
tive in democratic societies and a key con-
cept invoked to challenge escalating practices 
of dataveillance».  However, dataveillance is 
a practice mainly conducted by corporations 
that seek to make a profit from personal in-
formation. The problem with scoring sys-
tems is largely related to their lack of regula-
tion and transparency.  Using the example of 
the Chinese Social Credit System, Cinnamon 
argues that the Chinese are facing a future in 
which their «identity and social status will 
become increasingly externally shaped […] 
rather than intersubjectively through equita-
ble social relations of recognition».  
Surveillance capitalism is the capitaliza-
tion by companies of their dataveillance 
practices. The term was coined by Shoshana 
Zuboff to describe several processes by which 
corpo-rations commodify personal infor-
mation, which has fostered the development 
of big data analytics. The cornerstone of big 
data analytics, in turn, is that every actor, 
event, or transaction can be made visible. 
However, the capacity to monitorize and use 
this information is held by very few compa-
nies. Additionally, the economics of personal 
data is first based on dubious business ethics 
and then sustained by undue technical obsta-
cles and unsatisfactory laws and regulations.  
Against the corporate use of personal da-
ta, Cinnamon uses Nancy Fraser’s theory of 
ab-normal justice. This framework stems 
from three obstacles to parity of participa-
tion: maldis-tribution (not having the ability 
to participate equally in social life due to lack 
of resources), misrecognition (the inability to 
shape one’s identity due to institutionalized 
hierarchies) and misrepresentation (the ina-
bility to control one’s own representation).  
Briefly, according to this view, when a pro-
cess prevents individuals from enjoying pari-
ty of participation, it becomes unjust. 
Although this framework serves to char-
acterize the abnormal justice derived from 
the accumulation of personal data by corpo-
rations,  it fails to raise an exhaustive critique 
of scoring systems. That is because theoreti-
cal scoring systems have multiple positive as-
pects. It is in their implementation that the 
fragile equilibrium is potentially broken, 
jeopardizing the privacy of those subjected to 
them. And the danger of an authoritarian use 
of a database with detailed profiles of all citi-
zens seems serious enough danger to look for 
a solution elsewhere. 
 
█  4 Restating the problem 
 
In this section, I begin by drawing an 
analogy with the continuum model from so-
cial psychology. I then explore why the Driv-
erless Car Problem entails a hard choice, to 
finish with a defense of a solution to the di-
lemma based on age-relative equality. 
 
█ 4.1 Continuum model 
 
The solutions hitherto considered evoke 
the extremes of what Susan Fiske and Steven 
Neuberg called the continuum model of im-
pression formation. Their model intends to 
explain how individuals form impressions of 
others. One extremity corresponds to catego-
ry-based (or heuristic) processing and the oth-
er to attribute-based (or systematic) pro-
cessing. This model explains how we naturally 
try to fit strangers into categories to save 
cognitive resources, but also how, when do-
ing so becomes problematic because “the 
other” does not fully match the stereotype, 
we shift towards an individuated analysis. 
This transition from heuristics to systematic 
processing is known as decategorization and 
allows us to classify subjects as individuals 
and not as group members. This, in turn, 
serves to eliminate category-based biases.32 A 
solution to the Driverless Car Problem based 
on an individual approach would thus foster 
decategorization. 
The nature of the problems that individu-
al and statistical solutions face is substantial-
ly different: on the one hand, statistical ap-
proaches are doomed to fall into correlative 
categories, making it hard to think of a Moral 
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Machine Experiment that is in fact morally 
acceptable. On the other hand, individual 
approaches seem to be constrained by suffi-
ciently serious practical difficulties that push 
us to explore alternative responses (since the 
possibility of individual scoring systems de-
grading into authoritarian instruments is too 
high a risk to bear). Neither of these solu-
tions seems good enough. 
To complete the analogy, what can also be 
inferred from the continuum model is that the 
extremities are only two points within a great-
er range of available options. Therefore, we 
need not be satisfied with one of the two 
without first exploring other options. Both 
approaches – the individual and the statistical 
– embody the idea that individuals can be dif-
ferentiated and compared. What makes each 
point of the continuum different is the 
amount and nature of features known about 
the individuals in each case. Therefore, defin-
ing the threshold for what constitutes suffi-
cient information to make a morally accepta-
ble distinction in terms of both quantity and 
quality will also define the nature of the solu-
tion, pinpointing it along “the continuum”. 
Finally, and with regard to a possible sce-
nario where more than one solution seems 
feasible, I shall defend the Minimum Inva-
sion Principle: If there are two or more solu-
tions, one requires less information than the 
others and all seem morally sound, the less 
invasive one should be chosen. This I will de-
fend shortly. 
 
█ 4.2 Trapped in a hard choice? 
 
The Driverless Car Problem is a targeting 
problem.33 It demands we first define the pos-
sible targets and then design and implement 
the criteria to choose between them. But to 
resolve whose life ought to be spared seems 
to be a hard choice. In this regard, however, I 
hope that by better understanding just what 
makes this a hard decision, we can come up 
with a fair solution. To do so, I use Ruth 
Chang’s work on hard choices.34 
Let us consider a rational agent facing a 
hard choice, which is in turn defined as a situ-
ation in which the agent must decide be-
tween two alternatives when «one alterna-
tive is better in some relevant aspects, the 
other is better in other relevant aspects and 
yet neither seems to be at least as good as the 
other overall in all relevant aspects».35 In 
hard choices, the agent’s reasons to make one 
choice or the other run out because the alter-
natives don’t match the trichotomy “better 
than”, “worse than”, and “equally good”. 
Thus, it is neither ignorance, nor incommen-
surability, nor incomparability that makes 
the choice hard, but the fact that alternatives 
are on a par.36 
Should the Driverless Car Problem turn out 
to be a problem that has emerged from igno-
rance, incommensurability, or incomparabil-
ity, the decision would then be easier than we 
thought. However, asking whose life – Mary’s 
or James’s – is more valuable, seems in fact a 
problem of parity and, therefore, a hard 
choice. But what if we could restate the prob-
lem in different terms? We then might be able 
to avoid a choice between options on a par, 
escaping what would otherwise become a 
moral trap. More on this in due course. 
Chang differentiates between the choices 
in which one has first-personal authority, 
when «your judgement […] determines the 
truth of the matter, give or take a margin of 
error»,37 and the ones in which that is not 
the case. The Driverless Car Problem, if any, 
would fit into the second kind of choice, for 
“The Decider” [i.e. the algorithm or, ulti-
mately, the programmer] is not directly in-
volved in the situation – the criteria behind 
the decision-making process are set before-
hand. One way to regain first-personal au-
thority could be by compelling the users to 
choose a decision tree they liked before start-
ing the journey. Yet the cost of doing so 
would be unbearable, for the passengers 
could opt for one that protected them over 
the others in all cases, granting them undue 
power that the other parties would not have. 
She then makes a case for the relevance of 
practical certainty rather than knowledge. Ig-
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norance or uncertainty of certain data that is 
relevant to making a choice is not the true 
problem, but rather the fact that «none of 
the usual trichotomy of relations [better 
than, equally good, and worse than] holds for 
the alternatives».38 It is the way alternatives 
relate to each other and not us being uncer-
tain that makes a choice hard. 
If the problem is lack of information, the 
solution will involve using more detailed pro-
files of the subjects affected. But that will not 
suffice, for once you perfectly know Mary 
and James, you will realize that you have two 
alternatives that are, in respect to what mat-
ters (or V, borrowing Chang’s notation) very 
different, «but neither is better than the oth-
er and nor are they equally good. They are on 
a par».39 So what criteria V should the alter-
natives be compared on? 
The manner in which alternatives relate 
to each other in the Driverless Car Problem 
depends on how V is defined. If V was, let us 
say, “the value of someone’s life”, I fear Mary 
and James would be on a par, for it can be ar-
gued prima facie that one is not better than 
the other (their evaluative difference is unbi-
ased) but they are not equal (the magnitude 
of such evaluative difference is nonzero) – 
this, despite the fact that finding an uncon-
troversial definition of “the value of some-
one’s life” seems to be a task beyond the 
scope of this exercise. Unfortunately, the so-
lution proposed by Chang when we have to 
make choices with alternatives “on a par” re-
lies on will-based choices, which involves cre-
ating our own will-based reasons to justify a 
decision in a hard choice,40 creating a theo-
retical cul-de-sac for the case discussed here. 
The hard choice here is the one that the 
software engineer designing the decision tree 
of the algorithm will face at her desk – or we 
face from the comfort of our armchairs. We 
no longer have autonomous agents “making” 
their own reasons to decide in a situation 
that involves them directly, but a design team 
that must decide how decisions that do not 
affect them should be made (this “should” re-
flects the moral component of the problem). 
Consequently, arguing for a process of mak-
ing our own will-based reasons – in Chang’s 
terms – does not seem to offer a solution to 
the Driverless Car Problem. 
But V need not be “the value of someone’s 
life”. There is a whole range of possible crite-
ria, each one bearing different pros and cons. 
In light of this, and consistent with the Min-
imum Invasion Principle, I advocate for the 
least intrusive amongst all the morally ac-
ceptable options. That is, one for which the 
amount of information required about the 
subjects involved is as non-invasive as possi-
ble but that minimizes, at the same time, any 
possible moral recriminations in the after-
math of the decision. The motivation behind 
this principle is to ensure, to the extent pos-
sible, that the privacy and individual rights of 
those involved in this type of accidents will 
be preserved. The discussion should then 
gravitate around how to define the criteria 
“V” to which alternatives are compared, 
making differentiation between subjects a 
consequence of the nature of V. On this ac-
count, once the criterion is established, the 
amount and precision of the information re-
quired to differentiate between individuals is 
a corollary. By implementing a morally ac-
ceptable criterion that allows for making a 
decision based on the classic trichotomy [bet-
ter than, worse than, and equally good], we 
might find a way out of this maze. But what 
criterion could we use? 
 
█ 4.3 Time for equality 
 
Patrick Lin, in Why ethics matters for au-
tonomous cars, remarks on the importance of 
ethics in the Driverless Car Problem through 
an example. Imagine an autonomous car that 
must make a choice: «it must either swerve 
left and strike an eight-year old girl, or swerve 
right and strike an 80-year-old grandmoth-
er»;41 inaction, however, will result in the kill-
ing of both individuals. Lin suggests that, in 
this case, many would claim “the lesser evil” 
would be swerving to kill the grandmother. 
Mainly for two reasons: «that the girl still has 
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her entire life in front of her […] [and that] the 
little girl is a moral innocent».42 
But Lin claims that neither option is moral. 
The main point of his thesis is that age is irrele-
vant in this scenario. To support this, he con-
trasts it with another example where age seems 
to be more determining (i.e. rejecting adult ac-
tors for a child’s character in a movie).43 
He concludes by stating that «a reason to 
discriminate does not necessarily justify that 
discrimination, since some reasons may be ille-
gitimate».44 «Discriminating on the basis of 
age in our crash scenario would seem to be the 
same evil as discriminating on the basis of race, 
religion, gender, disability, national origin, and 
so on, even if we can invent reasons to prefer 
one such group over another».45 However, and 
although it does seem to be the same evil, it is 
not. For even though regulators intend to or 
have already prohibited making age-based de-
cisions,46 I believe there is a strong case for us-
ing age as the criterion. 
Time constitutes an organic unity (con-
tinuing with Ruth Chang’s terminology). That 
is, time’s quantity and quality are not «inde-
pendent determinants of the evaluative differ-
ence in V-ness [the comparison criterion] be-
tween two items, […] they are interdepend-
ent».47 I believe, however, that “time” entails 
even more than that. Time is the non-
reversible context in which one’s life unfolds: 
who we are is, somehow, defined by how we 
spend our time. And age, as a time-dependent 
variable, is different from other [more or to-
tally] static variables such as race, gender, or 
national origin. Against Lin’s view, I will de-
fend the argument that sparing younger indi-
viduals constitutes a morally acceptable solu-
tion to the Driverless Car Problem. 
First, age, due to its time-dependent na-
ture, is equalizing. Unlike race, gender, sexual 
orientation, and other categories of the kind, 
everyone’s age changes equally. Thus, an in-
dividual’s age will not be a static number but 
a value that increases as time passes – and it 
will increase at the same rate for everyone. If 
this criterion is implemented, the car will 
swerve to protect younger individuals. Ex-
tending this logic, it is easy to see that a new-
born baby would have one hundred percent 
probability of being the youngest subject in-
volved in the accident. Because of that, she 
will have the greatest chance of being spared. 
However, as her age advances, her probabil-
ity of being the youngest involved will de-
crease, therefore increasing her chances of 
being targeted. 
Given any individual, if we put together 
all the values for the probability of being the 
youngest person involved in a driverless car 
accident that she has held throughout her 
life, we obtain her life-distribution of proba-
bility. At a particular moment, everyone 
holds a different individual value, which de-
pends on each one’s age at that time. Yet the 
overall life-distribution is the same for every-
one. It starts from its maximum in terms of 
the probability of being spared and then de-
creases over time. 
Thus, the older person, now being target-
ed by the car, was once in the position of the 
younger person, who is now spared. Yet the 
spared one will be, at some point in the fu-
ture, in the position of the one who is being 
run over. Unlike the other features that Lin 
mentions, or the categories that the Moral 
Machine Experiment suggests, age provides 
room for equality, for every individual is 
bound to have a similar life-distribution of 
probability of being saved. This I shall call 
age-relative equality. 
Individuals are given preference accord-
ing to their age, and that could be interpreted 
as ageism. However, this form of differentia-
tion departs radically from what Robert Neil 
Butler first described as ageism. Saving the 
young is not proposed here out of a system of 
beliefs and prejudices held [by the middle-
aged] against the old or the young, that re-
flects «a personal revulsion to and distaste 
for growing old, disease, disability; and fear 
of powerlessness, “uselessness”, and death».48 
On the contrary, the reason for sparing the 
young(er) is to ensure that everyone is treat-
ed equally. This solution is not a defense of 
the “lesser evil solution”, buttressed on the 
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young having their whole life ahead of them 
and being “moral innocents”, as Lin sug-
gests.49 Neither does it stems from an alleged 
value intrinsically linked to youth, that grants 
younger people some sort of metaphysical 
privilege. The difference proposed here rests 
on the idea that everyone throughout their 
lives should have the same distribution of 
probability of being saved. This difference, 
however, becomes less significant when the 
ages of potential targets are relatively similar. 
Should age-relative equality suffice to make a 
decision between a fifteen- and a seventeen-
year-old? What if the individuals are just a few 
months apart? These cases highlight some of 
the tensions of the approach here presented. If 
one is not willing to bite this bullet, age-
relative equality will need further conditions 
to address small age gaps. But the possibility 
of a nuanced approach will demand more in-
vasive profiles – and that in turn redirects us 
to a statistical approach, the downsides of 
which have been discussed at length. 
Second, I have defended the position that 
majority acceptance is not a necessary condi-
tion for a decision to be fair (see Section 2). 
However, and from a practical point of view, 
the support of an accepting majority allows 
for easier implementation of the solution. In 
this sense, Awad and colleagues found that 
the majority of respondents to their experi-
ment preferred sparing “the stroller”, “the 
girl” and “the boy”.50 Thus, the majoritarian 
intuition is consistent with the principle. 
This convergence, however, is deductively 
independent from my argument, for the rea-
sons behind the appeal to equality – although 
counting with an accepting majority surely 
represents a practical benefit. 
Finally, age seems to imply a rather small 
sacrifice in terms of disclosure; it is non-
invasive, in the sense that age is not a private 
datum that would put the construction of 
one’s persona at stake. Moreover, and from 
an instrumentalist perspective, it is fairly easy 
to implement: although the solutions to the 
Driverless Car Problem are limited by tech-
nology as well, it is plausible to imagine a way 
for the car to know precisely what age any-
one involved in an accident may have: via 
small devices, precise facial recognition, or a 
more futuristic solution. I leave any possible 
moral implications related to the mecha-
nisms used to harvest the data open for fur-
ther research.  
 
█  5 Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of this exercise has been to find a 
moral solution to the Driverless Car Problem 
by contesting two possible approaches: a sta-
tistical approach, similar to that of the Moral 
Machine Experiment; and an individual ap-
proach inspired by the Chinese social credit 
system. 
I first criticized statistical approaches. 
Their use of correlative categories and ma-
jority-based decision-making procedures 
serves to institutionalize the patterns of dis-
crimination embedded in society. I have also 
argued that statistical approaches are over-
reductive and entail a degree of uncertainty 
that seems to challenge the validity of any so-
lution to a moral dilemma that stems from 
any alleged majority. 
On the other hand, I have shown how in-
dividual approaches can very easily become 
authoritarian. To avoid this outcome, I have 
suggested that such approaches should bring 
together fair principles, systematic imple-
mentation, and transparency. When these 
principles are observed, individual scoring 
systems come with multiple benefits. But 
since a bad implementation could pose a se-
rious threat to privacy or allow for thee 
wrongful use of detailed information about 
citizens, I have argued that a solution that 
withstands moral scrutiny will not resemble 
either of these two alternatives. Other op-
tions could have been considered: tossing a 
coin, random choice, or saving the driver no 
matter what, inter alia. However, neither 
chance nor undue priority seem to make a 
strong enough case to leave off seeking a bet-
ter alternative. My intention has not been to 
fully develop the schemata for a morally good 
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algorithm. On the contrary, I intended to 
challenge some of the assumptions that are 
being made in order to predict what the es-
sence of a fair solution to the Driverless Car 
Problem would look like. 
The Driverless Car Problem involves a hard 
choice. The value of the life of the individuals 
involved in a car accident is not equal, but nei-
ther is one individual better than the other: 
their evaluative difference is unbiased but has 
nonzero magnitude. Therefore, they are on a 
par. However, we can change the nature of the 
problem and bring the solution back to the 
domain of what Ruth Chang calls the classic 
trichotomy – “better than”, “worse than” and 
“equally good”. To do so, we must discard 
“the value of someone’s life” as the evaluative 
criterion and look for another one. The chal-
lenge then has been to find a criterion that can 
be morally justified, because what makes this 
choice hard is how the alternatives relate to 
each other and that, in turn, is determined by 
the criteria used to evaluate and compare the 
options. 
I have defended the argument that basing 
the algorithm on an age-relative egalitarian 
criterion would provide a morally sound so-
lution to the Driverless Car Problem. Giving 
priority to younger individuals would imply 
that everyone had the same life-distribution 
of probability to survive an accident situa-
tion. Additionally, the amount of data re-
quired to implement this approach is insig-
nificant, making it more feasible from a prac-
tical perspective. 
On a separate account, I have responded to 
a possible critique that might accuse this view 
of ageism. The main counterargument is that 
the differentiation proposed is a means to en-
sure equality. It does not reflect discrimina-
tion against the elderly grounded on age itself 
or on features intrinsic to advanced stages of 
life, but is instead based on an intention to en-
sure equal treatment for everyone. 
With the advent of driverless cars, the 
consequences of an accident will no longer 
exclusively concern liability problems – eth-
ics will play a crucial role. And with this pa-
per I have tried to develop a morally ac-
ceptable solution to the Driverless Car Prob-
lem: one based on an egalitarian treatment of 
the individuals involved. If I have succeeded, 
a car can swerve without moral reproach. If 
not, we may find ourselves driven towards a 
moral crash. 
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